The
question can be rephrased as “Is
Descartes right in saying that we cannot prove that we are now awake and not dreaming”? It is a question about how we can distinguish
between what is real and what is imaginary. How can we know that we are not constantly
dreaming? Descartes’ doubt implies there
is a possibility that one is dreaming right now, or that one is always dreaming.
In all fairness, who has never had similar doubts? Surely we all can remember
occasions when the reality in our dreams was so vivid, palpable and very much like our everyday
experiences that only after we woke up
we found to our surprise that the reality and events were just a mental
projection and that all of this disappeared the moment we opened the eyes.
Depending on
the approach we take, the answers to the question will vary. If we decide to
take a global sceptic’s approach and jump headlong into the “rabbit hole” of
regress argument, we will soon see that our search for foundational beliefs
will lead us nowhere, and we will have to agree with Descartes. To every argument and justification against
Descartes’ claim, a sceptic can say that you still do not know whether all of
that is not a product of your dreaming brain.
On the
other hand, if we take a commonsensical pragmatic approach supported with our day
to day experience, we will have to disagree with Descartes. Firstly, his assumption that foundational
beliefs are the only warrant of certainty is flawed. We have no means and no
time to look for foundational beliefs every time we come across a debatable
knowledge claim. What is more, certain
claims do not have a foundational belief. Secondly, Descartes formulates his sceptic hypotheses only on the assumption
that sensory-based knowledge might be unreliable. Sense perception is only one
of a number of cognitive faculties we use to gain knowledge about the world. At
every moment a network of cognitive faculties is at play.
Our common
sense provides us with rational arguments that can be the proof Descartes’
seems oblivious to. Argument #1 has
already been stated above: when we are
awake we are aware of the two distinct states
(sometimes we are aware of
dreaming when we are asleep, and we can control the course of the events) . Surely
a sceptic will reject it, saying that the awareness of the two states does not
exclude the possibility that we are dreaming about a dream in a dream. So
if #1 is insufficient, let us go through
a list of other signs that bear more weight.
Argument
#2: The reality we experience in wakefulness differs in a lot of respects from
the reality in our dreams. One of the features of dreams is the discontinuity
of narration, absurdity, lack of coherence. Laws of physics break down in
dreams, we can fly, jump over high buildings, we teleport from a place to
place, we want to run but our feet stay put, we meet long gone relatives, or
assume roles we do not perform in our wakeful life. This is not what we experience when we are
awake.
Argument
#3: Certain sensations in dreams do not resemble the same wakeful sensations,
e.g. excruciating physical pain (Springett). In fact, if we feel physical pain
in dreams, it is not the pain generated by a dream, but an actual pain whose
source is located in the body (e.g. toothache giving us hard time), and in that
case we usually wake up.
Argument
#4: Intense emotional sensations evoked by the events, such as terror, often cause the dreamer to wake up suddenly, horrified
and confused. Again, this is not what happens in our waking life (I really wish
it would be the case, to “wake up” when things in life get too stressful or
unbearable).
Argument #5: “Principle of coherence” and critical
thinking are two of the signs of waking life. In wakefulness, we can
clearly see how our current state and experiences are linked to our life. The narrative in our life constitutes
a coherent network of events and
relations; there is consistency and compliance
with the laws of physics (Springett).
Argument #6:
our mind (or the intellect to use Descartes’ term) intuitively recognizes what
is “clear and distinct” about our waking experience. In the course of the
dialogue with himself, Descartes formulates a reflection that whenever his senses fail him, it is the mind that recognizes
what is clear and distinct (wax argument).
To sum up, Descartes is not right believing that ‘there are never any sure signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep’.
WORKS CITED
Guttenplan, Samuel. Hornsby, Jennifer; Janaway,
Christopher; Schwenkler, John. Reading Philosophy. Wiley. Kindle Edition.